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ABSTRACT
Logistics is a major challenge for multinational corporations seeking to do business in China. 
Transportation and warehousing are two core activities of logistics which will have to be 
outsourced or produced internally by foreign firms entering the China market. This paper 
focuses on road and rail transportation, the primary forms of transport utilized to move 
finished goods, as well as the warehousing and distribution center service sector.
Trucking services and costs are observed to be poor by Western standards. There is no 
established less-than-truckload (LTL) industry and there are limited trucking networks 
offering one stop shipping across the country. None the less, trucking will have to be the 
backbone of any distribution network in China for finished products. Rail service is even 
poorer. There are capacity constraints and finished goods movement is not a priority of the 
Chinese railways. Warehousing capacity inherited from state owned enterprises is 
inadequate, but new distribution centers are being built rapidly.
Foreign firms need to recognize these limitations in service, capabilities and capacity in 
planning their distribution networks. The fragmented nature of both the trucking and 
warehousing sectors places a premium on the value added by third party logistics providers 
(3PL’s) who have the knowledge and the relationships with local trucking and warehouse 
firms to minimize the risk of a supply chain breakdown. The selection of logistics suppliers 
is the most critical logistics decision in the Chinese environment.
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INTRODUCTION
China has enjoyed significant economic growth 
leading to a position in the world as a global 
manufacturing center with the ability to produce 
quality products of all types, at a cost and degree 
of efficiency that is difficult to match in most 
other countries. Companies who have produced 
products in other parts of Asia, such as Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, have shifted their manufac­
turing to China. Firms which once found Mexico 
to be a low cost manufacturing location have 
begun to relocate production to China. Many of 
these firms are multi-national corporations 
(MNC’s), outsourcing their manufacturing, or 
international retailers who are sourcing products 
for consumption in Europe and North America. 
In addition, production is increasingly relocated 
in China as the basis for penetrating the growing 
domestic market within China itself and the rest 
of Asia.
The quality and cost of transportation and 
logistics services are important factors in con­
sidering the role of China as a source of products 
or materials, as a manufacturing location, or as 
a market for products. MNC’s need to assess how 
products will be moved to and from locations in 
China to determine the total landed cost of 
sourcing products or contracting production in 
China. Sourcing from or manufacturing in China 
may result in longer, more variable supply lines 
that affect product availability and 
responsiveness of the supply chain. This, in turn, 
may require increased inventories or dependence 
on premium transportation. Firms that are 
seeking to enter China to market their products 
must recognize the logistical capabilities that 
exist in China and adapt their manufacturing 
and distribution strategies accordingly.
Most of the economic growth of China has been 
in coastal regions, specifically around three major 
metropolitan areas: Guangdong, Shanghai and 
Beijing/Tianjin. Much of the initial foreign 
investment, sourcing and manufacturing subcon­
tracting is concentrated in these areas. Further, 
these regions have become significant consump­
tion centers as the income and local population 
have grown with the increase in industrial 
output. These industrial areas are relatively well 
served by modern sea and air ports and the most 
highly developed highways in China surround 
these cities. Transportation and logistics service 
is available from domestic, foreign and joint ven­
ture logistics service suppliers, competing for 
international and local freight movement. In 
contrast, the domestic transportation and logis­
tics system connecting these regions to each 
other is not so well developed and the logistics 
system connecting these regions to inland China 
is even less developed. The quantity and quality 
of domestic logistics services will become increa­
singly important as the sourcing and production 
of finished products moves further inland. This 
is occurring because of growing income and cost 
disparities between regions in China, making 
coastal locations more expensive for business. In 
addition, central government is actively pro­
moting more balanced development across the 
country. As other geographic regions of China 
develop, comparative and absolute advantages of 
each region will emerge. Supply chains requiring 
intercity and interregional product flows will 
grow. Finally, domestic logistics is growing in 
importance as the non-coastal retail markets 
develop.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the 
status of selected logistics service sectors within 
China for the movement of finished (non-bulk) 
goods. This may be purely domestic movement or 
movement of products moving internationally 
but with a significant inland portion. Transpor­
tation and warehousing are two core activities of 
logistics which will have to be outsourced or 
produced internally by foreign firms entering the 
China market. The focus here is on road and rail 
transportation, the primary forms of transport 
utilized to move finished goods, as well as the 
warehousing and distribution center service 
sector. An attempt is made to appraise the 
current situation, the underlying problems and 
opportunities, and the implications for the 
logistics strategy of foreign firms operating in 
China.
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MACRO-LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE IN 
CHINA
Numerous studies have found that logistics costs 
are comparatively higher in China than in most 
other developed countries. The Logistics Insti- 
tute-Asia Pacific (2002) estimated that logistics 
costs were between 16 and 20% of China’s GDP 
but only 12% for Japan, 10% for Europe and 
9.9% in the US in 1999. An estimate of 16.7% of 
GDP is given by Wang (2004) who also indicates 
that during the tenth five-year plan period, the 
nation’s goal is to decrease logistics costs to 15% 
of GDP, providing an annual savings of 240 
billion.1 This aggregate productivity is corrobor­
ated by more specific evidence. Morgan Stanley 
estimates that logistics costs are 40% of total 
industry product costs in China versus 20% in 
the U.S. and only 5 to 8% for most MNC’s, and 
that accumulated inventory to GDP is 50% in 
China versus 4% in the U.S. (Ho and Lim, 2001). 
Mao, He, and Wang ( 2004) add that not only do 
logistics costs account for more than 40% of the 
total costs of goods, if the costs of packing, 
transportation, storage and damage resulting 
from improper transportation and handling are 
added, logistics costs would exceed 60% of total 
costs. Ho and Lim (2001) find that electronics 
and food products cost 40- 50% more to ship in 
China than in North America. They conclude 
that the Chinese logistics sector is a “huge 
market calling for efficiency.”
The failing of China’s logistics sector is also 
reflected in perceived service levels. Poor 
handling and transportation protection is 
reflected in the higher cost of logistics quoted 
above by Mao et al. (2004). According to a study 
by the China Association of Warehouses and 
Storage in 2001, the goods damage rate for all 
modes of transport exceeded 2% and on-time 
delivery was less than 90%. The survey found 
that 57% of the manufacturing corporations 
surveyed were dissatisfied with their present 
logistics outsourcing service, and would seek new 
logistics service providers in the following year. 
This showed that most logistics enterprises 
cannot meet the service standard of the modern 
logistics market (Ma and Shi, 2004).
China’s logistics services sector is composed of 
third party logistics (3PL) firms, various modes 
of transport and the providers of warehousing 
and distribution center services. In the following 
sections, the road, rail and warehousing/distribu­
tion center segments are examined. These are 
the building blocks upon which most MNC’s will 
have to rely for basic logistics services whether 
provided through a 3PL or directly by such 
providers.
TRUCKING SERVICE AND 
PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES 
FOR MNC’s
The Role of Trucking in China
Trucking is the most widely used mode of trans­
port in the world for moving packaged or 
finished goods and this is no less true in China 
(Easton, 2003). As reported in Table 1, trucking 
accounted for almost 10 billion tons of freight or 
about 77% of the country’s tonnage in 1999. 
However, trucking is traditionally used for short 
haul movement less than 500 kilometers with 
the average ton moving only 59.9 kilometers in 
1999. Urban congestion is a problem for such 
short haul movements, but intercity long haul 
trucking is the bigger challenge for MNC’s as 
production moves inland and many multi­
national corporations expand their domestic 
networks. The lack of efficient and effective 
intercity truck service is one of the most urgent 
logistics challenges in China.
China’s Trucking Industry and Regulation
China’s trucking industry is highly fragmented, 
with more than 5.4 million trucks registered to 
more than two million truckers and little or low 
entry barriers (Easton, 2003). Companies tend to 
be small scale, with the average trucking 
company having fewer than two units. For 
example, the Hubei province has 28,600 
operators, but each has an average of only 1.43 
vehicles. Heilongjiang province has 117,911 
registered vehicles and each operator has less 
than 1.6 vehicles (Xu, 2004). Sinotrans is the 
largest trucking operator in China with only
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TABLE 1












Road 678.3 9.904 58 1351.7
Rail 1551.6 1.672 768 57.9* 1
Water 2751.1 1.146 1855 116.5
Air 5.2 .017 2482 1522.22
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2003, Ho and Lim 2001
1 Excludes electrified railways
2 Excludes international routes
3000 registered vehicles specializing in long 
distance.
The legacy of the planned economy was that 
most state-owned enterprises (SOE) were ver­
tically integrated, and had their own private 
fleets that operated at very low vehicle utiliza­
tion rates (Ho and Lim, 2001). Many SOE’s 
produced and distributed their products region­
ally or locally and when long distance transport 
was needed, rail was utilized. These private 
fleets entered the for-hire market in the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, providing a vast supply of 
trucking services locally and regionally.
A complicated licensing system restricts competi­
tion in the trucking industry. At the national 
level, the Ministry of Transport requires every 
service provider to obtain a national truck 
license. Each provincial government requires a 
license in the province of origin of the vehicle 
operation (e.g., the domicile of the operation). In 
most cities a local transportation bureau re­
quires a local truck title for the purchase of a 
truck and its registration. Finally, the local 
police authority will require a local truck opera­
ting license to provide transport services within
a city (Hertzell, 2001). Even permission at the 
national level is no guarantee that local regula­
tions will not prevent a national company from 
operating in many provinces or cities.
There are few nationwide trucking companies 
able to offer integrated, one-stop shopping for 
truck services. Those that exist are not inte­
grated carriers, but generally networks of long 
haul and local trucking companies. Inefficiency 
in the form of interlining is caused to a large 
degree by local protectionism. Long haul freight 
may mean loading and unloading at provincial 
borders as it is handled from carrier to carrier 
(Trunick, 2003).
Today in many localities, out of province 
trucks are arbitrarily stopped at city 
borders and subjected to tolls that local 
trucks don’t pay, or to flat restrictions on 
completing delivery. In many cases this 
requires an entire truckload to be un­
loaded and reloaded onto a local truck. 
This costs both time and money, and also 
creates opportunities for local protection­
ism and corruption, (American Chamber, 
2002 and 2003).
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For example, non-Shanghai trucks are pro­
hibited from entering Shanghai during the 7 am 
to 11 pm period due to traffic control, while 
Shanghai licensed trucks have limited access (Ho 
and Lim, 2001). Permits are also very costly and 
road tolls are high, with some tolls unauthorized. 
It is estimated that tolls make up 15-20% of the 
trucking costs in many traffic lanes compared to 
2-3% in Europe (Drewry, 2003). Regulations 
equivalent to the Interstate Commerce Act in the 
U.S. do not exist to support free and efficient 
movement between different cities or states in 
China. Reform of the highly bureaucratic and 
restrictive licensing systems seems unlikely in 
the short run because local provinces would lose 
a significant source of tax revenue (Drewry,
2003).
In summary, the fragmented nature of the 
industry, the regulatory restrictions and his­
torical lack of demand for for-hire trucking due 
to SOE trucking, has provided little opportunity 
or incentive for developing an integrated truck 
netwrork across China.
Less-than-truckload (LTL) operations, w^hich 
involve consolidation of many small shipments 
into large line haul vehicles, is inherently a net­
work operation. Due the lack of an integrated 
truck network, shipping partial loads is difficult 
(Modern Materials Handling, 2002). What LTL 
services do exist are limited to very long dis­
tances where some co-loading takes place. 
Unless the co-loading is well planned, transit 
times are usually long and inconsistent, especi­
ally on inland routes (Pinnekamp, 2003). The 
result is that manufacturers usually do not move 
small loads over long distances and the existing 
practice in China is that almost all intercity 
cargo moves as full vehicle loads. What is 
variable is the size of the vehicle. If the load is 5 
tons, then a 5-ton truck is used, and if the load is 
8 tons, an 8-ton truck is used and so on. The 
consequence of industry fragmentation and the 
heritage of SOE trucking is that an integrated 
LTL industry has yet to develop and mature.
Trucking Performance and Operating 
Practices
Direct transportation and, in particular, trucking 
costs are not high by international standards but 
are high as a percentage of the total cost of the 
product. Unfortunately, the costs of trucking are 
often minimized through operating practices that 
are unlawful, unsafe or sacrifice service quality. 
As a result, the total logistics cost becomes a 
barrier to profitably doing business in China.
Truck service is frequently evaluated as unreli­
able when it is cheap, and reliable when it is 
expensive. The absence of an effective network is 
a barrier for filling backhauls, thereby requiring 
the purchase of round trip capacity. This is 
exacerbated by natural imbalances in freight 
movement. Front hauls from the coast to western 
China tend to be finished goods and consumer 
goods while front hauls from western China to 
the coast are bulk products. Refrigerated 
vehicles going west typically run back empty. 
Door to door service of dry goods to and from top 
tier cities is easiest and cheapest, but trucking to 
second tier cities and for specialized commodities 
such as refrigerated or dangerous goods is much 
harder. LTL reliability is compromised by the 
tendency to delay schedules until full loads are 
accumulated, unless of course the shipper is 
willing to pay the premium for under loaded line 
haul movement. Furthermore, the low volume of 
consolidated LTL freight results in the utiliza­
tion of small, inefficient line haul vehicles, at 
least by Western standards.
Although there are large fleets of modern 
tractors pulling chassis for containers at port 
cities, the majority of the road equipment is 
substandard. Historically, trucks were open-back 
and tarpaulin-covered with poor protection for 
goods (Alberts, Randall, and Asbury, 1997). Due 
to the small size of most operators, very few of 
these trucks are set up to move containerized 
freight with only 20% of freight trucks in China 
being containerized (Ho and Lim, 2001).2 Very
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few of these companies can afford to upgrade 
their equipment because of limited access to 
capital. Shipments are often hand loaded and 
unloaded (Pinnekamp, 2003), and people loading 
trucks sometimes lack the training or initiative 
to pack a truck in an effective and efficient 
manner. This leads to cargo damage from cargo 
shifting and movement which is compounded by 
the lack of pallet standardization, leading to 
longer truck loading and unloading times, more 
cargo shifting and less efficiency.
Many transport vehicles are moving overloaded. 
It is an issue that almost anyone moving 
products in China will encounter. Transporters, 
as a norm, are known to haul 50% in excess of 
their legal payload, and sometimes as high as 
three times their legal limit. This is more the 
standard business practice than the exception 
with companies in China taking advantage of 
this cost savings despite the inherent problems 
that result. Recently, new legislation was applied 
evenly across state and local levels whereby 
haulers have to pay RMB 200 for every vehicle 
overloaded by 30% and about RMB 400 for each 
overloaded by 50%. Previously fines were a maxi­
mum of RMB 50 for each overloaded vehicle.
Before the clampdown, haulers would 
modify and strengthen their vehicles to 
carry up to double the legal weight capa­
city. Checks were also not as stringent 
then ... now they are conducting checks at 
toll stations and trucks found to be 
overloaded will be forced to unload excess 
cargo on the spot (Viswanathan, 2004).
For those firms which cannot risk violating the 
law, costs will inevitably rise. SembCorp Logis­
tics (2004) reported that their China operations 
had been impacted by rising costs of road trans­
portation services brought on by the Chinese 
government’s initiative to control the overloading 
of trucks. Multinational chemical companies 
have found that their transport costs had gone 
up for the same reason.
Fierce and destructive competition between 
carriers continues to make the whole industry
unprofitable. When competitors can obtain old 
and frequently unsafe trucks to move goods, they 
compete with trucks which are fully depreciated. 
The cost structure of these competitors is very 
low compared to operators that purchase newer 
equipment in order to meet or exceed standards 
of safe operation (American Chamber, 2002). The 
costs of trucks have been rising due to more 
stringent emissions standards as well as the 
demand for newer, safer equipment. Many of the 
smaller operators do not have the capital to 
make such investments. However, government 
enforcement of regulations, such as annual ve­
hicle inspections has increased the pressure to 
buy newer equipment.
Shippers have difficulties in tracking freight 
while in transit by road. For most Chinese 
trucking firms, the cost of installing a satellite 
tracking system is too high. Cheaper alternatives 
for track and trace such as mobile locators and 
telephone call monitoring are being improved 
and developed. Statistics validate the benefits of 
adopting new information technology.
Among the 200 logistics service providers 
in Xian, the 72 highway transportation 
operators that included (integrated) com­
munication services as part of their 
overall services had better business 
performance (Xu, 2004).
Highway and Trucking Infrastructure
In the past, poor trucking service has been the 
result of a poorly developed highway infra­
structure. For example, during the mid 1990’s, it 
was observed that a team of two drivers working 
16-hour days could be expected to cover only 496 
miles per day, a rate of less than 32 miles per 
hour (Alberts et al., 1997). However, this has 
rapidly improved in the last decade. There has 
been substantial improvement with the Chinese 
government (Ministry of Communications) in­
vesting billions of dollars on new highways. In 
2003, the Chinese highway network consisted of 
more than 1.3 million kilometers, with 0.2 million 
additional kilometers scheduled for completion 
in 2005, making up a national network of nearly
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1.5 million kilometers. The National Truck 
Highway program has over 35,000 kilometers of 
toll roads with a total of five vertical and seven 
horizontal national routes scheduled for comple­
tion by 2015 (Institute of Highway Economics, 
2003). The trip from Shanghai to Guangzhou, for 
example, has been reduced from three to five 
days to 36 hours with two drivers, thanks to 
newly constructed expressways (Wu, 2003).
Road quality will continue to vary in such a vast 
country. Larger cities and coastal regions have 
decent roads and highways, while western 
regions and less developed interior areas of the 
country need major upgrading. The mountainous 
and desert terrain will always be a problem. 
Twenty-five percent of villages still have no 
access to suitable roads. However, the Chinese 
government has planned a considerable increase 
in highway investment for the western region 
(Institute of Highway Economics, 2003). Despite 
the government’s increasing expenditures on 
new roads, many of the existing roads are still in 
poor condition or remain unpaved. Thus, average 
travel speed is quite slow compared to North 
American standards. It will be many years 
before the practical speeds and transit times 
within China will be comparable to speeds in 
North America and Europe for comparable 
distances.
In addition to building roads, the Ministry of 
Communications has planned to build 45 main 
road hubs in central cities, as well as cargo con­
centration and distribution centers throughout 
the country (Institute of Highway Economics, 
2003). These would form the fixed nodes in a 
national logistics network, facilitating freight 
transfer, consolidation and communication.
The Prospects for Trucking in China
Highway infrastructure barriers are being re­
duced through massive building programs but 
the real barrier that needs improvement is how 
the trucking industry that utilizes the highways 
is managed and organized. The majority of the 
trucking industry is too fragmented to meet the 
demands of modern large scale production. The
majority of the industry cannot offer one-stop 
shopping, door-to-door shipment visibility or 
nationwide LTL services frequently demanded 
by MNC’s moving finished products. The 
potential for loss and damage, unreliable service 
and slow transit times must always be con­
sidered by MNC’s in choosing trucking service 
providers and designing a distribution network 
in China. MNC’s need to exercise a significant 
amount of due diligence in selecting their 
Chinese trucking suppliers.
Since January 1, 2001, with China’s entry into 
the WTO, foreign companies were allowed to 
establish jointly-owned firms with local com­
panies to enter the highway transportation 
market. From 2003 onward, foreign investors are 
allowed to be sole proprietors of highway 
transport companies, and both sole proprietors 
(local or foreign-owned) and local joint ventures 
can enjoy the same privileges. This has increased 
competition within China’s highway transport 
sector. These new entrants will bring new capital 
and new technology, and bring more experience 
and advanced business management techniques 
into the trucking sector (Zhou, Zhu, and Xiao, 
2001). However, this will only bring marginal 
improvements if the regulatory and licensing 
impediments to developing a truly integrated 
network for a trucking firm cannot be reduced. 
The root cause of many operational inefficiencies 
is the provincial and local restrictions that have 
limited cross province movement of freight.
RAIL: ANOTHER LOGISTICS 
CHALLENGE FOR MNC’s
Rail’s Role in China
Rail is the second most utilized mode of trans­
port in China with respect to tonnage, moving 
1.7 billion tons, or about 13% of total 
transportation tonnage in 1999 (see Table 1). 
Rail is the main mode of transport in terms of 
ton kilometers since the average length of haul 
by rail is more than 13 times the distance by 
truck. The core of the rail system was built for 
and is the lifeline for moving bulk goods such as
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coal, minerals, and grain, but it is unsuited for 
transporting finished goods or perishables 
(Hertzell, 2001; Wu, 2003). Extensive delays, 
inflexibility, and lack of service orientation have 
prevented both domestic and international users 
from using rail, and this is exacerbated by the 
lack of rail sidings at both plants and ports. 
Surveys consistently find that foreign joint ven­
tures use rail even less than domestic companies.
China’s Rail Industry and Regulation
The rail industry is highly concentrated, with the 
Ministry of Railways (MOR) controlling most of 
the country’s rail service under the China Rail 
umbrella (Easton, 2003). Many vestiges of 
operating as a firm in a traditional planned 
economic system remain. Therefore, organiza­
tional and managerial reforms will be more 
difficult in this transport sector (Network & 
Information, 2001).
The MOR has made progress.
Three years into the ninth five-year plan, 
the China rail system was restructured 
and major non-transportation enterprises 
were spun off including rail engineering, 
rail construction, locomotive vehicle build­
ing, communication signaling and civil 
engineering, ten higher education insti­
tutes, and other vocation training or adult 
education schools. MOR has opened 227 
independent stations. The MOR was 
downsized by 320,000 people in this pro­
cess. The MOR, in the tenth five-year 
plan, will try to improve its transportation 
and service standard. MOR aims to set up 
a comprehensive network throughout the 
nation for passenger transport to accom­
plish the goals for “out by dawn, in by 
dusk” within 500 km, “out by dusk, in by 
dawn” within the 1,200-1,500 km range, 
and “arrival in one day” if traveling within 
2000-2500km. For goods transportation, 
the goals are to improve delivery time, 
develop express delivery systems, and 
explore and utilize modern management 
models to provide complete door to door
transport service. MOR aims to speed up 
the development in consolidated transport 
and refrigerated transport in order to 
expand market availability for new 
economic growth. To accomplish these 
goals, MOR will speed up the construction 
of western railways to strengthen its 
“eight horizontal and eight vertical” net­
work during the tenth five-year plan. Near 
the end of this tenth five-year period, the 
national track network will cover 75,000 
km, including the new expansion of over
2.000 km in the West. Express tracks will 
increase to over 14,000 km, double tracks 
to 25,000 km and electrical tracks to about
20.000 km. The tenth five-year plan will 
adopt new technologies including railway 
modernization, improving IT and com­
munication systems, and setting up safety 
and security standards, etc., diminishing 
the shortcomings of traditional railway 
transport (Translated from Chinese, 
Network & Information, 2001).
Organizational impediments may have been as 
significant as infrastructure. In the past, each of 
the MOR’s regional divisions prohibited their 
locomotives from crossing divisional boundaries in 
order to retain control over their key equipment. 
This increased transit time and trip variability. 
The MOR recently converted its 14 geographical 
administrations into semi-autonomous legal enti­
ties. Each administration manages and operates 
the assets (infrastructure and rolling stock) 
allocated, while the MOR carries out overall 
coordination of inter-administration traffic. This 
decentralization does not appear to have ad­
dressed the power switching issue. Furthermore, 
the State Planning Commission (as opposed to 
the MOR) controls the prioritization of industries 
receiving rail service (Alberts et al., 1997).
Rail Performance and Operating Practices
Numerous studies have documented the failings 
of the Chinese railway system with respect to 
the movement of non-bulk goods and perishables 
(Hertzell, 2001; Ho and Lim, 2001; Wu, 2003). 
Cost is not one of these failings. Rail cost is
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substantially lower than truck cost, not only 
because of the economic features of rail, but 
because the state-owned railway is subsidized. 
However, low costs are more than offset by poor 
service in the movement of finished goods.
Railroad service is viewed as inefficient and 
unreliable, and is mostly used to ship cargos that 
are not needed urgently. Transit times are long 
and service reliability is poor (Ho and Lim, 
2001). Wu (2003) notes that some cross country 
deliveries take up to 60 days, which is too slow 
for goods such as perishables or anything of high 
value. More importantly, train service is not 
responsive, with long lead times for services. On 
frequently serviced routes, such as Beijing to 
Shanghai, bookings can be made a week in 
advance (Ho and Lim, 2001). For less than 
carload, two weeks advance booking is required 
(Hertzell, 2001). For less frequent routes, such as 
to and from Xinjiang, bookings generally need to 
be made 30 to 40 days in advance (Alberts et al., 
1997; Wu, 2003).
Shipment delays are common and the railways 
are plagued with seasonal capacity shortages. 
The general policy is to give priority to passen­
gers and then to basic commodities from the 
agricultural and extraction industries. Forty 
percent of rail capacity is taken up by the coal 
industry, resulting in unmet demand for rail 
movement from the agriculture sector during the 
harvest season. This policy results in seasonal 
availability of services to other shippers as well. 
Passengers traveling during the long holidays in 
May, October, and the New Year, coupled with 
agriculture shipments, result in reduced capacity 
for the movement of packaged or finished goods 
(Ho and Lim, 2001). During harvest season, for 
example, lower density routes require a month to 
a month and a half advance booking for space 
(Drewry, 2003). A Chinese firm reported that 
extra payments may be demanded by local rail 
line operators to make box cars available or to 
give priority to a cargo during high traffic 
periods (Wu, 2003). Recently, general merchan­
dise has been accorded a much higher priority in 
the MOR’s booking system and container block 
trains have the highest priority within this 
general cargo sector (Drewry, 2003).
Railways have very few connections to industrial 
parks and seaports or sidings at manufacturing 
plants. This means that practically all finished 
goods moving by rail have to be unloaded and 
reloaded onto trucks for final delivery. The extra 
handling results in added exposure to loss and 
damage. The damage rate on rail is 2-3 times 
higher than trucking (Hertzell, 2001). Damage 
usually occurs when goods are transferred from 
rail to local trucking and is most typically due to 
transportation workers who are not adequately 
trained in handling sensitive goods (Wu, 2003). 
Theft is an endemic problem. This has led manu­
facturers to employ their own security guards on 
trains to safeguard goods (Wu, 2003).
Poor information systems make it almost impos­
sible to track goods in transit. There are few 
services such as notification of arrival at rail 
stations, automated car tracking, and integrated 
information technology between the provincial 
railways. Loss of refrigeration after reconfigura­
tion of compartments at changeovers is also 
common. Several of these deficiencies appear to 
stem from the regionalized operating structure of 
the Chinese railways.
Until recently, most rail cars were 60-ton closed 
boxcars and containerization was limited (Al­
berts et al., 1997). A small fleet of five to ten-ton 
domestic containers that fit onto open-top 
railcars has recently been introduced and the 
flatcar fleet is being expanded to handle more 
maritime containers. In general, however, rail­
way containers are not compatible with those 
used by shipping companies, and overseas 
shipments require the unloading and reloading 
of cargo (Alberts et al., 1997; Wu, 2003). Cargoes 
have to be unloaded and reloaded when using 




In contrast to trucking, China’s rail infrastruc­
ture continues to be a significant part of the 
problem. China now boasts railways of 73,000 
km when electrified track is included (Wah,
2004). Although about 27% of this total is double 
tracked, capacity is still less than demand, and 
the rail freight infrastructure has yet to meet 
containerized multimodal transport demand. 
Rail system modernization is lagging behind 
road development, although plans to expand in 
the West are in place. There is little intermodal 
capability in China, although this area has been 
targeted for improvement (Government of Cana­
da, 2003). In 2003 there were more than 100 
joint venture railway lines including Maersk, 
Orient Overseas Container Lines, U-Freight and 
DHL, operating trial joint ventures with SOE’s. 
Foreign rail operators often bring specialized 
services and new technology, and this will in­
crease as WTO commitments encourage foreign 
investors to enter the rail sector. As of 2004, 
foreign majority shares in rail joint ventures 
were allowed and the entire domestic rail cargo 
sector will be fully opened to foreign investment 
in 2006 under a WTO agreement (Wu, 2003).
The Prospects for Rail in China
Rail in China will improve but it cannot be 
depended upon to be a core transportation 
provider for finished goods across China. The 
railway continues to be an SOE with the 
traditional political, organizational, and human 
resource constraints that impede streamlining 
operations and making the service-operations 
mix more market responsive. Many of rail’s 
failings can be traced to economic policies (prior­
itization of freight), lack of infrastructure 
(tracks, loading facilities), and organization 
(regional administration), but the basic fact of 
life is that the majority of China’s rail system is 
run by an SOE which holds a monopoly on 
intercity rail service. Commercialization of the 
enterprise is needed, including incentives for 
productivity and customer service.
The WTO will require changes in this situation 
but, while deregulation is in the future, there is 
little or no potential for privatization in the near 
term. It appears that the state-owned enterprise 
in rail will remain, but it will welcome foreign 
investment. China’s rail system will be under 
pressure to restructure to attract more com­
mercial business and to achieve higher efficiency. 
One restructuring plan is to establish separate 
market oriented corporations to manage freight 
transport, passenger transport and railway 
infrastructure. Authorities will most likely 
release control of the transportation of general 
merchandise and free up prices in incremental 
steps (Ho and Lim, 2001).
MNC’s must recognize the limitations of China’s 
railway system as their economic activities move 
further inland and into Western China. Unlike 
the U.S. and Europe, a well-developed inter­
modal system does not exist, so long distance 
transport of volume shipments will continue to 
depend on much costlier trucking. Much longer 
lead times must be planned for when using rail. 
On less congested routes, companies have plan­
ned around a one week delivery window. On 
congested routes, a four-week arrival window is 
more common. Interestingly, this has led some 
Chinese firms to prefer an imported product to a 
domestic product in part due to the unreliability 
of domestic rail transportation (Wu, 2003).
Some third party logistics providers have by­
passed the rail capacity and service problem by 
contracting out rail capacity. G-time Logistics, 
which had a long relationship with the MOR, has 
chartered rail services on North-South routes, 
carrying fresh food and products from the South, 
and grains from the North. This is similar to the 
situation in the U.S. in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s, when confronted with poor rail service, 
APL chartered rail service to go from the West to 
East coast of the U.S. in land bridge service. 
Interestingly, APL Logistics, now a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Neptune Orient Lines, is in 
the process of doing the same in China. They 
signed a memorandum of understanding with
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Eastern China Railway Express to take advant­
age of the railway supply chain network with 
160 rail hubs. Other heavy users of rail are third 
party providers such as Bao Gong, PG Logistics 
and St. Anda (Chow, Wang, Xu, and Ding, 2003), 
who all have the scale to charter rail routes to 
get better control on scheduling and operations. 
In short, large customers and 3PL’s who can 
aggregate rail freight can contract the train 
service out to get reliable rail service and 
assured capacity. MNC’s should consider this 
option if they have the volume, or leverage 3PL’s 




Traditional warehousing in China focuses on 
long-term storage of raw materials and 
manufactured goods that are held as stock that 
companies sell. These warehousing facilities 
barely meet the needs of these “push” type sup­
ply chains, much less the needs of MNC’s and 
progressive Chinese firms whose supply chains 
need to be responsive and agile.
Ninety percent of China’s warehousing capacity 
is controlled by SOE’s (Easton, 2003). Up to the 
mid-1980’s, SOE’s all used private warehousing. 
By 1985, they realized that they had excess 
capacity and started selling warehouse services 
commercially. This warehouse space was gener­
ally located and designed for a specific company. 
Thus, while there was actually a lot of ware­
house space, much of it was not up to standard 
or in the right location. Since most SOE’s owned 
their own space, there was little demand for 
commercial warehousing and this sector remained 
underdeveloped. Furthermore, most SOE’s served 
regional markets, with few formal regional ware­
house networks and, until recently, no formal 
national network of public warehouses.
The major exceptions were the state-owned 
transportation companies that owned and 
operated warehouses to supplement their trans­
portation operations. Sinotrans is the largest
freight forwarding company in China controlling 
more than three million square meters of 
warehousing space. Guo (2001) notes that China 
Rail offers “an extensive network throughout 
China and adequate warehousing facilities are 
available at or near rail stations in most cities.” 
China Material Storage and Transportation 
Company operates warehousing and trucking 
across the country. In addition, 3PL’s often 
provide warehouse service as part of their fulfill­
ment services. A recent survey of 3PL’s operating 
in China indicates that approximately 32% con­
tract out warehousing, but most build their own 
facilities (Dai, Wang, Wong, Wang, and Xiao- 
hong, 2003).
Warehousing Performance and Operating 
Practices
Most of the warehousing capacity built before the 
mid 1990’s was for bulk cargo and many are multi­
story facilities. These warehouses are poorly 
designed, use little automation, and are highly 
dependent on manual labor. Poor information 
systems lead to inaccurate stock counts and high 
loss rates. Lack of integration between ware­
housing and transportation service makes it 
difficult to achieve shipment visibility across the 
whole supply chain. There is little racking and 
modern inventory management is absent. 
Weather protection from heat, rain or snow is 
minimal. The result of these poor designs is inef­
ficient material flow, including multiple manual 
handling which leads to high damage and 
pilferage rates.
A case study of the type of warehousing available 
to an MNC in northeastern China (outside of the 
major metro areas of Shanghai, Beijing/Tianjin 
and Guangdong) is a joint venture automobile 
plant which did not have enough storage facili­
ties at the plant site. The existing plant complex 
could not be expanded to provide storage space, 
but stor-age space was available at a nearby 
military base. However, the warehouses were 
vintage 1930’s buildings built by the Japanese 
during their occupation. They had poor electri­
city, poor temperature control, substandard pest 
control, little shelving, and were multi-storied.
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They contained no automation to facilitate 
movement (Pinnekamp, 2003).
Palletization is not common in Chinese ware­
housing. The older warehouses are not designed 
for fork lift equipment and the incentive to use 
pallets seems to be missing from SOE’s. More 
importantly, there is no standard pallet size in 
China. China uses all the different types of 
pallets from different countries, though the 
European 1,000 mm by 1,200 mm pallet is most 
widely used. Utilization of pallets and other 
transport aids is also very limited. There is no 
available or manageable pallet pool for hire.
Finally, the quality of warehouse management is 
suspect. High discrepancies in actual and 
recorded inventory data, high damage and mis­
sing rates, and a general lack of real-time 
product and order tracking have forced manu­
facturers to build (and operate) their own 
facilities (Ho and Lim, 2001).
Distribution and Logistics Centers (Parks)
The absence of a modern, responsive ware­
housing industry has led many MNC’s, operating 
as joint ventures, to build their own warehousing 
capacity or obtain such services from 3PL’s.
In the last 20 years, with the emergence 
of “zero-storage” “logistics alliance” and 
“logistics supply chain” concepts, the 
logistics goals for warehouses have be­
come to shorten turnover time, lower 
storage rate and costs, and improve 
services. Warehousing holds great signifi­
cance as it provides a time factor between 
raw materials, industrial goods and final 
products. As corporations start to regard 
customer service as an active and value- 
added competitive tool, warehousing will 
become more important. To achieve these 
goals in warehousing, third party logis­
tics service providers made a thorough 
analysis of labor productivity and costs. 
They focused on redesigning the ware­
houses to build modern logistics centers 
based on location models, and analyzed
the planning and relocation of advanced 
logistics centers to speed up the proces­
sing of orders and to lower logistics costs 
(Translated from Chinese, Liang and Yu, 
2004).
MNC’s and foreign logistics service providers 
could only have minority ownership of ware­
housing and storage in a joint venture up to 
2002. But in 2003, with the WTO accession, 
foreign firms can have majority ownership of 
warehousing and storage, and may operate 
wholly-owned warehousing and storage subsidi­
aries by 2005. Private, foreign-operated firms 
after WTO accession may put government-run 
facilities at a disadvantage. However, govern­
ment and private companies are in a program of 
building modern logistics centers in major cities. 
This is at both the National and regional levels.
The government stills controls more than 90% of 
the warehouses and has planned modernization 
of the warehousing industry in China. The 
Chinese government is planning to build 45 dis­
tribution hubs throughout China over seven 
years starting from 2002. These hubs operate 
advanced warehouse management systems with 
automated materials handling, cold storage and 
customs clearance. There has been some concern 
expressed about how capable these government- 
run centers will be in competing with foreign op­
erated firms once the WTO agreed to relaxation 
of foreign entry comes into effect (Government of 
Canada, 2003).
According to the statistics from the State 
Planning Commission, most cities have plans to 
build more logistics parks in their region. The 
Chinese government believes in consolidating 
types of industrial activity in one area. Many local 
governments have designated logistics as their 
pillar industry. In order to encourage de­
velopment in this industry, each government has 
their favored policies. In the Yangtze River Delta 
for example, the government nominates “Key 
Logistics Firms,” based on the firm’s record of 
good service and reputation. With this govern­
ment recognition, these “key logistics firms” enjoy 
favored policies which include (Chow et al., 2003):
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• Funding of logistics projects where the 
government either guarantees the loan or 
provides direct financing.
• Relaxed market entry within Shanghai and 
in Shenzhen for the Pearl River Delta. By 
2005, when a substantial amount of China’s 
WTO commitment will be realized, most 
firms will be registered in Shanghai or Shen­
zhen.
• With municipality authorization, companies 
are charged lower local business fees.
• Favored land price. In China, land prices 
differ for different land uses. The lowest price 
level is charged for industrial usage, while 
the highest is for commercial or trade pur­
poses. When a company applies for the 
building or development of a new logistics 
park or project, it enjoys the lowest land 
price level, the industrial land price.
In Shanghai, three major logistics parks have 
been developed. They are the preferred locations 
for logistics development in Shanghai. One of 
them is WaiGaoQi Free Trade Zone adjacent to 
the Shanghai Port, focusing mainly on export 
logistics. There are 700 companies gathered 
together along with warehouses and distribution 
centers in this district. The second is PuDong 
Logistics Park near the PuDong New Airport. 
This logistics park focuses on air cargo and is 
occupied by numerous airfreight logistics 
companies. The third is the North-West Logistics 
Park. At this location, most of the retail and 
wholesale stores have their own distribution 
centers. In addition, Shanghai is planning to 
build a new port on the two Yangshan islands on 
the southern border of Shanghai, which will 
become another important seaport logistics 
center in China.
However, while the government objective to 
stimulate new business is a legitimate goal, 
there is a danger in granting special privileges in 
a non-transparent manner. The Shanghai 
government has actually taken equity stakes in 
some favored firms, granting them special privi­
leges or financial assistance, or free advertising 
for certain firms solely based on their friendships 
with the government. For instance, government 
protection within the air cargo handling business 
has created a “duopoly” of two companies favored 
with exclusive licenses to perform air cargo 
ground handling services at the Pudong Airport. 
This protection from competition has led to high 
prices and poor performance relative to global 
standards (American Chamber of Commerce, 
2003).
The Prospect for Warehousing in China
Warehousing capacity and services are rapidly 
improving to meet the needs of the MNC’s who 
require modern facilities built for movement 
rather than storage as well as value-added 
services. The Chinese government’s active support 
of distribution and logistics center development 
and relaxation of regulations will increase both 
capacity and quality in this sector. What is more 
important, the government is actively promoting 
organizational reform in SOE’s, which will 
increase the outsourcing of non-core activities 
such as transportation and warehousing, fuehng, 
and the demand for a logistics services industry.
Foreign participation in rail, trucking, and other 
logistics sectors such as customs brokerage and 
forwarding are regulated. Unlike those sectors, 
foreign participation in warehousing and logis­
tics centers is encouraged (Wu, 2003). For 
example, China’s leading 3PL’s are large foreign 
companies licensed to operate as Wholly Foreign 
Owned Entities (WFOE’s). Also growing in impor­
tance are foreign companies that are currently 
restricted to operating as joint venture partners 
or through free trade zones (FTZ’s). In 2001, the 
government of Shanghai’s Pudong New Area 
lifted all restrictions on warehousing and logis­
tics companies setting up operations in the 
WaiGao Qaiao Bonded Zone, equalizing their 
position with trading companies in the zone. 
Foreign companies are now allowed to operate 
these warehouses themselves to store a wide 
variety of raw materials, parts and other fin­
ished goods for onward sale and shipment into 
China. In Wai Tao Qiao, foreign operators gener­
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ally maintain high standard warehouses at their 
manufacturing facilities, which can double as 
regional distribution centers. A growing number 
of providers are “one-stop-shops” that offer wide 
ranging import services that extend beyond 
logistics (Wu, 2003). At the same time, large 
SOE’s in the logistics sector are actively 
transforming themselves. There is substantial 
evidence that they are determined to become 
leading logistics providers, having initiated 
restructuring plans to transform themselves 
from basic service providers to 3PL’s. Often the 
changes are in conjunction with a joint venture 
or a less formal partnership with a foreign 3PL 
that brings new management and information 
technologies to the partnership.
SUMMARY AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MNC’s
Multinational companies are taking advantage of 
China’s manufacturing capabilities and require 
logistics services both within the developed 
coastal regions and inland. They also want to 
capitalize on China’s growing domestic market. 
One challenge will be to find reliable and fast 
truck service in a fragmented, localized industry 
that operates under a patchwork of local regula­
tions. Another challenge will be to find rail 
service in the capacity constrained and mostly 
state owned rail network. Obtaining good distri­
bution center service as opposed to warehousing 
space is also difficult. China is making great 
strides in providing new intercity highways, new 
railway trackage and building modern distribu­
tion facilities in logistics parks. However, the full 
benefit of these massive infrastructure improve­
ments will not be achieved if these assets are not 
utilized effectively by the service providers them­
selves.
The root problems that remain are primarily 
managerial and inherent in the structure of 
these logistic service sectors. An asset-based, 
integrated network of either TL or LTL service 
will not be forthcoming until local and provincial 
regulations that restrict competition in trucking 
are removed. These same barriers impede the 
growth of larger scale firms which can better
afford information technology. The railroad 
monopoly that exists today is unlikely to disap­
pear in the near future so change in the railway’s 
operating practices and service priorities will 
come about slowly. Only in the warehousing 
sector, where there are both government invest­
ment and relaxed entry to foreign operators can 
major improvements in service levels and 
capabilities be expected in the near term. MNC’s 
now have more options to build their own 
distribution facilities when for-hire services are 
inadequate. The overall reality is that MNC’s 
will find transportation and warehousing 
services in China to be slower, less reliable, less 
visible, less responsive, more expensive and 
perhaps less available than in most Western 
countries. MNC’s will have to plan their overall 
distribution network and supply chains to 
recognize these realities.
Many industry observers and even the Chinese 
government sees the development of a healthy 
and competitive third-party logistics industry as 
one of the solutions to the lack of integrated and 
professional trucking services. Wu (2003) 
indicates that while foreign companies often 
form a patchwork of partnerships with local 
logistics and transportation operators to form 
some sort of distribution network, few licenses 
for transportation are granted for nationwide 
operations (and even those are subject to 
protectionist measures of local governments). 
Thus, 3PL’s have emerged as a popular choice for 
MNC’s seeking to move products across the 
country. These include non-asset based as well 
as asset-based 3PL’s who are knowledgeable of 
local regulations and who can build relationships 
with local logistics service suppliers in the truck 
and warehouse sectors. Some of these 3PL’s are 
large global logistics service providers who have 
expanded their coverage in China by working 
with many Chinese agents in order to provide 
broad coverage of China. Others are SOE’s with 
large transportation or warehousing assets 
across the country such as Sinotrans, China Post 
or China Material Storage and Transportation 
Company who are seeking to modernize rapidly. 
Many are regional transportation companies 
which have successfully serviced important MNC
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clients and leveraged their success into wider 
operations and expanded services. Similarly, 
some of the most successful 3PL’s have risen 
from in-house logistics divisions that are lever­
aging the logistics capabilities and network 
developed for the parent company. Another 
benefit of using established 3PL’s of significant 
size is that they may be able to open the doors to 
reliable rail service in corridors where they have 
contracted out rail capacity. It may still be 
unwise to only deal with one 3PL, as all the 
provinces have different rules and regulations 
and no one agent can provide full coverage. A 
strategic solution is to focus on achieving depth, 
rather than breadth, of market penetration. By 
focusing activities on a single city or region, the 
distribution problem is simplified.
Manufacturers and exporters should consider 
regulatory risks whether using a 3PL or working 
directly with multiple transportation and ware­
housing suppliers. Enforcement of commercial 
regulations at the national level has become 
transparent under the WTO but local enforce­
ment remains arbitrary. Some rules are not 
widely publicized, while others are vague and 
open to interpretation. Reliance on a favorable 
interpretation of the regulations is dangerous. 
Companies should be aware of the potential risks 
and consider preparing a strategy to cope with 
an unfavorable change in interpretation. Since 
many of the rules are not publicized, identifying 
them will require working closely with an 
experienced Chinese partner. Consequently, 
carrier or 3PL selection is perhaps the most 
important logistics decision an MNC can make 
once it has decided to enter China. Chinese 
partners can be the key to success especially if 
they have prior experience in the geographic
area requiring logistics services. Such partners 
will be able to identify potential pitfalls and will 
have the network of business and government 
contacts needed to do business in China. To 
remain adaptable in China’s ever-changing 
markets, it is advisable not to become overly 
reliant on a single partner.
Partnerships between shipper and logistics ser­
vice providers have long been offered in Western 
economies as a means for achieving increased 
productivity. In the Chinese transportation and 
logistics environment, partnerships may be a 
strategic necessity to ensure that products in­
deed move to the right place at the right time at 
the right cost.
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ENDNOTES
1. China’s 10th five year plan is for the period 
2001 to 2005. These plans reflect the economic 
development priorities of the country and 
provide a blueprint and strategy for government 
economic development and reform activity. The 
first plan in 1953 targeted heavy industry. The 
tenth five year plan focuses on information 
technology but also identifies logistics as an 
industry to develop.
2. Containerized trucks refer to closed van type 
trucks versus open trucks such as flat decks or 
“open bed” vehicles.
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